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Abstract: 
 
The study of urban politics often focuses on the ability of urban regimes to successfully pursue 
their interests and goals.  However, scholars of urban politics only peripherally consider the role 
that courts play.  And when courts are incorporated, they are treated as exogenous to the political 
system.  This paper argues for the importance of treating the judiciary as endogenous to the local 
political system.  Courts are themselves political institutions and should be understood as such in 
the study of politics at the local level.  Doing so offers several benefits, including accounting for 
the ways in which state-level preferences operate as constraints on regimes (or are successfully 
resisted) and identifying federal regime influence on local politics.  The paper identifies the 
relevant criteria that ought to be collected in order to treat courts as endogenous and offers three 
case studies of what this would look like in practice.    
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Urban, State, and Federal Regimes in Local Politics: The Role of the Judiciary 
 
 Two theories have dominated the study of urban politics over the past several decades- 
growth machine theory and urban regime theory.  These two approaches account for a substantial 
amount of the research on development in urban settings, with urban regime theory drawing the 
most attention.1  Each offers valuable insights into the operation of urban politics.  The theories 
provide a counterpoint to the pluralism model of urban governance in Dahl’s Who Governs? 
(1961) and expressly focus on the informal dynamics of politics.  Unlike much of political 
science over the last two decades, urban politics has not been enamored with neo-
institutionalism.2  Stone offers some sense of this when he describes the approach of urban 
regime theory as: 
…seeking to understand how human agents in a given local context (or range of local contexts) 
see their situation and choose to act on it. Structures lie behind such activities as framing 
agendas, building coalitions, devising schemes of cooperation, and making use of and sometimes 
reshaping interorganizational and interpersonal networks, but the focus is on human agents in 
action. (2005, 333) 
 
This focus on “human agents” offers real benefits, particularly in identifying the 
nongovernmental factors such as business coalitions that play an important role in determining 
the outcomes of urban politics.  At the same time, there are some drawbacks to minimizing the 
consideration of institutions at the local level.  If we take the lessons from other areas of political 
science, we can see how institutions are both shaped by and shape politics in critical ways, and 
there is no reason to suppose that these dynamics would not be present at the local level as well.  
                                                 
1 There are certainly other ways of studying urban politics, including theories such as regulatory theory or network 
analysis, but there is broad agreement in the literature that these two approaches are the most common. 
2 Specifically, I mean the notion that the structure and design of an institution has an independent impact on political 
outcomes. 
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Some scholars, such as Pierre (1999), Lowndes (2001), and Rast (2009), have pointed this out 
and argued for greater consideration of urban institutions.  In this paper, my purpose is to argue 
for attention to a particular type of institution and its impact on urban politics- the judiciary. 
It is an understatement to say that consideration of the role of the judiciary in local 
politics has not been a big part of the study of urban politics.  Though legal constraints are not 
ignored at the local level (see, for example, Schleicher 2013's review of the local government 
law literature), these constraints are treated as exogenous shocks rather than endogenous to the 
political system.  Even case studies where legal decisions have decisive impacts on the outcomes 
of local politics engage courts no further than to say that a particular decision was handed down 
or that battles over a particular issue moved to the courts, as though courts were somehow 
separate from politics (see, for example, Meck 2014; Rast 2006).  I argue that the lack of 
attention to the judiciary as a political institution constrains the ability of scholars to understand 
several important dynamics of urban politics.  First, courts often (although not always- an 
important distinction explored below) reflect and enforce the preferences of state-level regimes, 
imposing critical restraints on the options available to local regimes, which can in turn be 
resisted to greater and lesser degrees.  This attention to the influence of states on urban regimes 
echoes the work of Leo (1998) and Gurr and King (1987).  Second, the jurisdictions of courts are 
typically not contiguous with city boundaries, meaning that their operation carries over to 
suburbs, edge cities, and other forms of urban communities.3  Indeed, much of the current 
research on “urban” politics focuses on metropolitan regions that extend beyond city boundaries, 
something reflected in two of my three case studies.  Third, federal courts provide a mechanism 
by which national-level regime policies are brought to bear in the local context, another 
                                                 
3 In most states, trial courts are organized by county boundaries while appellate courts can be either state-wide or by 
larger district. 
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important constraint on available policy options.  This too can be resisted at the local level in 
various ways that are worth exploring.  By recognizing that courts are political institutions that 
are part of the ongoing dialogue at the local level, the study of urban politics can be substantially 
enriched. 
In this paper, I will first provide a review of these dominant theories, with examples of 
the ways in which courts are under-studied in each.  I will then develop a set of questions that 
need to be answered in order to be able to treat courts as endogenous institutions at the local 
level.  I will conclude with some instructive case studies to highlight the dynamics that can be 
revealed. 
 
Theories of Urban Politics 
Of the two dominant theories of urban politics, the growth machine approach is primarily 
economic in focus while the urban regime approach is the more explicitly political.4  The first 
body of literature grows out of Harvey Molotch’s classic article “The City as a Growth Machine: 
Toward a Political Economy of Place” (1976).  Molotch argues that “the political essence of 
virtually any locality, in the present American context, is growth” (1976, 309–310).  This 
position leads to a focus on the conflict within cities over how best to use land.  Logan and 
Molotch (1987) make this explicit in their reformulation of the growth machine theory, 
identifying the central conflict in the urban environment as between “residents, who use place to 
satisfy essential needs of life, and entrepreneurs, who strive for financial return, ordinarily 
achieved by intensifying the use to which their property is put” (1987, 2).  Work in this tradition 
                                                 
4 As is common in multiple theories about a particular dynamic of politics, there is substantial overlap and 
complementariness between these different approaches, though they are distinct in important ways.  My purpose 
here is not to argue the precise boundaries of these theories, but instead to show that neither of them pay sufficient 
attention to the critical role that the judiciary plays in local politics. 
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examines who actually holds power at the local level, positing that elites pursue strategies within 
cities to advance growth (see generally Jonas and Wilson 1999).  Peterson’s City Limits (1981) is 
an offshoot of the growth machine approach, arguing that the dominant interest of cities is 
development given the many constraints on what cities can do.   
Growth machine theory was dominant in the 1970s and 1980s, but the urban regime 
theory that arose in the 1990s offered a more encompassing approach to thinking about urban 
politics.  The starting point for urban regime theory is often pinned to Stone’s classic Regime 
Politics (1989), although there were earlier iterations such as Fainstein and Fainstein (1983).  
Stone spells out his understanding of regimes at the beginning of Regime Politics, describing 
them as “informal arrangements by which public bodies and private interests function together in 
order to be able to make and carry out governing decisions” (1989, 6).  These are governing 
coalitions that use informal arrangements to operate through and around existing institutions in 
order to manage conflict and adapt to change.  Stone used the city of Atlanta as an extended case 
study to demonstrate the ways in which business coalitions and other informal groups worked 
together as a regime to manage everything from land use to desegregation. 
The theory of urban regimes has developed quite a bit since Stone’s initial explication.  
Central to the theory is the understanding that governing capacity is not the same thing as 
electoral outcomes.  Candidates may win elections, but that alone does not ensure the ability to 
govern.  That is achieved by bringing together coalition partners with the necessary resources, 
both governmental and nongovernmental.  This is accomplished in different ways in different 
cities, depending on the context.  Some regimes are maintenance regimes, which do not try to 
implement any substantial change.  Others are development regimes, focused on land use 
policies and economic growth.  It is here that Stone would place growth machine theory (see 
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Dowding 2001, 13).  Middle class progressive regimes pursue quality of life policies, while 
regimes devoted to lower class opportunity expansion focus primarily on redistributive policies 
(Stone 1993, 18–22).  This is an explicitly political economic approach to understanding politics. 
Other scholars have pushed for different emphases within urban regime theory.  
Imbruscio (2003), for example, calls for more attention to be paid to economic rationales, 
building on Peterson’s (1981) earlier argument.  Lauria (1997) called for a combination of urban 
regime theory and regulatory theory that adopts a neo-Marxian structural approach.  Dowding 
(2001) argues that the greatest attention should be paid to the collective action dynamics of 
regime members, so as to better understand how they operate.  Others, such as Rast (2009), have 
advocated for more attention to be paid to the role of institutions in regime politics.  Stone has 
consistently responded, offering both defenses (Stone 2004) and developments (Stone 2005; 
Ward et al. 2011) of the urban regime approach. 
 
The Judiciary as Exogenous Shock 
 When one turns to the specific findings and case studies of these theories of urban 
politics, how do they treat the judiciary?  An exhaustive review is obviously beyond the scope 
that can be offered here, but a survey of some of the most influential work in each approach is 
instructive.  Obviously, the courts are not relevant to all circumstances at all times, but I will 
show the ways in which greater consideration of the judiciary could have provided more 
effective arguments. 
 As noted above, Logan and Molotch’s (1987) formulation of growth machine theory was 
quite influential in the field.  Many of the chapters involve theory-building and a study of how 
property is used.  Chapter 5, however, is titled “How Government Matters.”  The focus is on 
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regulatory programs, such as zoning, growth control, and environmental impact reports as well 
as federal incentives.  For example, they consider that Houston, Texas is the only major U.S. city 
to not have any zoning laws, yet it looks much like other cities in terms of development.  Logan 
and Molotch argue that this is not simply a consequence of market mechanisms working on their 
own.  Instead, existing zoning controls in other cities respond primarily to entrepreneurial 
pressures in making numerous exceptions and Houston has over ten thousand deed restrictions 
that can provide restrictions, albeit unevenly (Logan and Molotch 1987, 157–158). 
 Not mentioned in this discussion of regulatory programs is what, if any, role courts might 
play.  For Houston, the puzzle of why development looks similar to other communities despite 
the lack of zoning laws may also be a reflection of state-level regulations enforced through legal 
decisions and the expectation of lawsuits.  It could also be shaped by federal judicial 
interpretations of the Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment which expand or constrict the 
remedies available to those opposed to a particular type of development.  On the flip side, Logan 
and Molotch look at the example of Santa Barbara, California as a community hostile to growth.  
There, too, they find that growth controls have limited impact, highlighting the ways in which 
water hookup moratoria can be avoided by using agricultural water meters for urban uses or 
offering variances for claims of special hardship (Logan and Molotch 1987, 161).  Absent is any 
consideration of how and why local courts went along with these variations.  Clearly these are 
viable interpretations of existing statutes, but they are not the only possible interpretations.  Why 
were courts willing to accept these interpretations?  Where growth is involved, legal challenges 
are common, but Logan and Molotch treat the outcomes as a given rather than contested. 
 Logan and Molotch do mention courts a handful of times in their chapter on government, 
but always in a way that treats them as something external to the process they are studying.  For 
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example, when discussing environmental impact reports (EIR), they note that those opposed to 
growth can challenge EIRs in court to further delay the process, though there is no consideration 
of why some courts might be more receptive to those delays than others (Logan and Molotch 
1987, 165–166).  When reviewing Urban Development Action Grants, they note the shift in 
support away from the poorer communities and toward suburbs and Sunbelt cities.  This triggers 
court intervention: “This finally led to court action, which resulted in reforms requiring suburbs 
to construct low-income housing as a condition of revenue-sharing support” (Logan and Molotch 
1987, 173).  That is the full extent of consideration of the courts, despite their important role in 
the ongoing struggles presented by the Urban Development Action Grants. 
 Logan and Molotch are hardly alone in this respect when it comes to the application of 
growth machine theory.  Peterson (1981), for example, builds his entire approach around the 
thesis that cities are constrained by state and federal governments and can, therefore, only pursue 
a limited range of policy approaches, namely development.  In defending this argument, he 
points out the ways in which national parties dominate local elections, leading to one-partyism 
(Peterson 1981, 113).  He offers examples of this focus on growth in the areas of air pollution, 
trade unions, and the economic crisis of New York City in the 1970s.  The judiciary is not 
considered in any of them.  This is particularly striking in the areas of trade unions and city 
bankruptcy.  As both McCann (1994) and Frymer (2008) find, the operation of trade unions have 
been deeply influenced by federal courts, themselves reflecting national political coalitions.  And 
New York City’s bankruptcy took place as a consequence of the Supreme Court’s decision that 
cities and counties, unlike states, do not enjoy sovereign immunity (Cowles v. Mercer 1869, 
Lincoln County v. Luning 1890, Riggs v. Johnson County 1868).  These decisions were enacted 
in response to particular social and economic pressures on the Court and also reflect the 
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influence of national political coalitions.  In this sense, the judiciary is not merely a constraint on 
the actions of the city, but a product of a broader political system. 
 More recently, Phelps (2012) sought to integrate growth machine theory with regulatory 
theory using a case study of Tysons Corner, Virginia.5  He argues, echoing Lauria (1997), that a 
growth machine approach pays insufficient attention to structural changes in capitalism.  In 
particular, Phelps is interested in “state interventions and their effects on the private sector and 
urban politics” (2012, 675).  State interventions,6 including planning and growth strategies, are 
carefully considered in the case of Tysons Corner emerging as an edge city, but no attention is 
paid to any interventions from the judiciary.  Tysons is a suburb that is divided by numerous 
other boundaries, including everything from county-level representation to postal codes.  One 
relevant government institution that covers Tysons Corner in its entirety is the judiciary, which 
has jurisdiction over the entire county.  In considering the interbranch relationships that Phelps 
acknowledges are a key part of the development of Tysons Corner (2012, 693), it would have 
served the study well to incorporate the legal institutions into understanding change over time. 
 That is not to say that courts have been completely ignored.  Studies focused on the 
impacts of regulation on housing have paid attention to legal decisions.  Ellickson (2005) points 
out the importance of accounting for court decisions when trying to specify the regulatory factors 
influencing housing prices.  Blumenthal (2014) follows through on this, paying specific attention 
to courts when discussing residential development in the D.C. area.  She goes so far as to include 
an entire section on the role of the judiciary.  She does acknowledge that courts were not a part 
of her initial study, but were added as a consequence of interviews with those who actually do 
development work.  Courts were mentioned so frequently by her interviewees that she realized 
                                                 
5 Phelps straddles the line between growth machine and urban regime approaches, using both, but self-identifies 
through the title and much of the article more closely with growth machine theory. 
6 Here Phelps uses state to describe government at all levels. 
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she needed to account for the institution in some way (Blumenthal 2014, 92).  Indeed, she finds 
that greater deference by the courts to local control was associated with the presence of more 
local regulation (Blumenthal 2014, 82).    As laudable as this effort was, it still treats courts as 
exogenous institutions, black boxes from which decisions emerge.  So too does Meck (2014), 
who has the most explicit consideration of court decisions.  Meck tracks the Mount Laurel 
doctrine imposing constitutional obligations for affordable housing in New Jersey and the 
numerous challenges to its continued role in the state.  Despite the centrality of court action to 
this aspect of development, the analysis does not consider the internal politics of the New Jersey 
courts at all. 
 Growth machine approaches are not alone in missing important ways that courts are a 
part of the fabric of urban politics.  Urban regime theory is just as guilty.  Throughout his 
extensive study of the city of Atlanta’s politics stretching from 1946 to 1988, Stone (1989) 
mentions courts and court decisions only rarely.  The early efforts towards urban renewal were 
halted by the Georgia Supreme Court, but this gets only a sentence worth of attention (Stone 
1989, 39).  School desegregation plays an important role in highlighting the operations of the 
urban regime, but once again courts are treated peripherally.  Despite the fact that it was court 
decisions that prompted the desegregation plan of 1959 and that delayed implementation until 
1961, there is not even a distinction made between federal and state courts or an evaluation of 
how the judiciary served to inject national-level political constraints on local-level decision-
making (Stone 1989, 47).  Strategy among black leaders within Atlanta regarding desegregation 
was shaped by expectations about what circumstances might lead to better litigation (Stone 1989, 
54–55).  Indeed, it is difficult to talk about the process of dealing with civil rights for African-
Americans in Atlanta without substantial consideration of the role that courts played.   
10 
 
This is not limited to the discussion of civil rights.  When it came to preservation efforts 
in the early 1980s, the study once again omits courts despite the fact that the U.S. Supreme Court 
had recently handed down a decision in New York holding that landmark preservation laws are 
not a taking (Stone 1989, 126–127; Penn Central Transportation Co. v. New York City 1978). 
While there is acknowledgment that the judiciary was important, there is little in the way of more 
extended study.  This stands out given the care with which Stone considers so many other 
aspects of the urban regime in Atlanta. 
 This blind spot regarding courts carries over into other work as well.  Stone (2004) 
praises the pioneering work of Robert Crain on school desegregation.  In particular, he notes that 
Crain was not attempting to trace the development of race relations in the United States or 
explain how the judicial process became the means by which desegregation was placed on the 
agenda.  Instead, he was examining “how desegregation was handled differently across a range 
of cities” (Stone 2004, 8).  Note how Stone separates the judicial process from how 
desegregation was handled at the local level.  Just a few sentences earlier, he points out the role 
that Judge Arthur Garrity took on in establishing a new set of civic relationships in Boston to 
implement desegregation, but this is left and never investigated further to explore why the 
federal court in Boston was able to and chose to act in this way. 
 As noted above, Stone is less interested in institutions than some other urban scholars.  
But even among those who emphasize institutions, courts play a minor role and are largely 
unexamined.  Dowding, though comparative in focus, emphasizes the importance of paying 
attention to state structures in order to understand the development of local regimes (2001, 15–
16).  Managerial versus mayoral systems are relevant, but the structure of the judiciary goes 
unremarked.  Rast (2009) uses the earlier work of Skocpol and Skowronek to build the argument 
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that institutions need to be accounted for in urban regime theory.  To ignore institutions is to 
miss how the institutions must fit together with informal power structures in order for urban 
regimes to be successful.  Rast provides a detailed case study of Chicago from 1946-1962, 
demonstrating that the efforts to pursue urban renewal were shaped by the nested informal 
powers and institutional structures of the city.  Remarkably, in the midst of the Daley machine, 
courts warrant only a single mention.  That is a reference to a federal suit that was filed by 
property owners to prevent the urban renewal and Rast merely notes that it was dismissed (2009, 
177).  At the time, most of the judges sitting in Cook County courts were closely tied with the 
Daley machine (Royko 1971, 64; Tuohy and Warden 1989, 45–46).  It stretches credulity to 
imagine that the makeup of the courts most likely to decide on urban renewal challenges did not 
influence the ability of the regime to pursue its goals.   
Courts get mentioned more frequently by Rast in another piece (2006).  In detailing the 
lack of a regime in mid-century Milwaukee, Rast repeatedly points out that decision-making over 
urban renewal, housing, and annexation shifted to the courts and state legislature (2006, 91, 94–
95, 98).  Despite this, that is where the inquiry ends.  Courts are treated as purely exogenous 
rather than something to be studied in conjunction with the rest of the local political dynamics.  
The retreat to courts is seen as a removal from local politics.  
Even where courts do get mentioned, they are almost exclusively federal courts, despite 
the far more substantial role that state courts play at the local level.  Hochschild (2008) could not 
be more explicit about this.  She states “cities have no court system comparable in importance 
and visibility to the federal judicial system; how does the relative lack of a judiciary 
change the study of relations among branches of government? (Hochschild 2008, 324).  Stop and 
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consider that for a moment.  State judiciaries, which handle the vast majority of legal business in 
the country, are considered virtually invisible in the operation of local politics. 
 Though far from comprehensive, the preceding review hopefully establishes that courts 
are rarely considered by urban politics scholars, and when they are it is only as exogenous 
institutions not directly relevant to the study of local politics.  I have endeavored to also highlight 
the ways in which incorporating courts in these studies would have offered greater insight into 
the operation of either the growth machine or the urban regime.  In the following section, I will 
sketch out an approach to treat courts as endogenous institutions for local politics.  
 
Courts as Endogenous Institutions 
 When considering how to treat courts as endogenous, a good place to start is by 
recognizing Peterson’s (1981) insight that the capacity of cities to act is limited by external 
constraints.  Peterson, however, pays little attention to the specifics of these constraints, moving 
directly to economic productivity as the primary interest.  If we pay attention to those constraints 
in ways he did not, we can find that the constraints, particularly those presented by the judiciary, 
are not static.  That is, at times the judiciary limits options available to cities, while at other times 
it creates them.  This insight is central to the importance of considering courts as endogenous.  
What are the reasons for this variation and what needs to be known in order to study it?  I will 
lay out a broad argument regarding the role of courts and then highlight the specific information 
that scholars ought to pay attention to in order to incorporate courts effectively in their research. 
 In much of what follows, there are some basic assumptions made, none of which are 
terribly controversial among scholars of law and courts, but which should be made explicit.7  The 
                                                 
7 For a nice summary of many of these assumptions, see Carter and Burke (2010). 
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first is that judges engage in interpretation of the law rather than discovering truth within the law.  
There are multiple possible interpretations of language, although some interpretations are 
foreclosed by the language of a statute.  For example, a judge interpreting the constitutional 
requirement that a representative be twenty-five years of age may engage in some interpretation 
about whether the candidate must be twenty-five prior to election day or just prior to being sworn 
in to office, but would not authorize a twenty-three year old to be a representative.  The second 
assumption builds on the first.  If there is room for interpretation, then judges will rely on their 
ideology to guide that interpretation.  This is all but impossible to avoid, since an individual’s 
world-view is likely to color any and all interpretations of the world around them.  The third 
assumption is that, regardless of selection method, judges will tend to reflect the ideology of 
those that place them on the court.  If the judge is appointed by a governor, they will have at least 
a substantial amount of ideological shared ground in common.  If a judge is elected by the 
citizens of a county, they will most likely share the ideological preferences of the majority of the 
voters.  Pickerill and Clayton (2004) offer an example of this dynamic at the federal level when 
they trace the ways that shifting attitudes about federalism in the conservative regime become 
reflected in the Supreme Court decisions on federalism in the 1990s.  This understanding of the 
connection between judges and the broader political system is reflected in work such as Graber 
(1993), Clayton and May (1999), and Whittington (2005), and is fundamental to the approach I 
am advocating here. 
Most frequently, local courts are enforcing state laws.  If a citizen of Los Angeles files a 
lawsuit to block development approved by the city in Los Angeles County Superior Court, the 
judge is going to look to state statutes that are relevant to determine whether there is a valid 
claim and what the standards are for resolving that claim.  This is a simple example of state-level 
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preferences being enforced at the local level through local courts.  Courts can serve to bring 
state-level regime preferences to bear on city regimes.  This isn’t the only possible outcome, 
however.  The judge in this case is likely interpreting a complex statute.  Perhaps it was a statute 
enacted by a previous state-level regime, but one which is disfavored by the current state-level 
regime.  If the judge came into office as a consequence of the current state-level regime, then the 
judge may choose to interpret the statute in such a way as to diminish its impact on the local 
regime.8  Or perhaps the judge represents the local regime’s preferences and will defy the 
existing state-level regime by interpreting a claim narrowly.  This is difficult to sustain, though, 
because of the possibility of appeal to higher level courts that are more likely to reflect state-
level preferences.   
This can be complicated further.  Perhaps the city knows that the local courts are going to 
reflect state-wide preferences in interpreting the statutes and crafts the proposed development in 
such a way as to preserve compliance and avoid litigation.  This is known as operating in the 
“shadow of the law” (Mnookin and Kornhauser 1979) and identifies the effects that expectations 
about litigation have on behavior regardless of whether courts actually become involved.  
Alternatively, the city could know that the local judges are unsympathetic to strict enforcement 
of the statute and be more aggressive in crafting the development, less concerned about bad 
outcomes in litigation.  Or national-level constraints could be introduced through the federal 
courts, even where states might be receptive to a growth machine regime at the local level.  
Either way, the actual constraint imposed on the city by the state is going to vary depending on 
the makeup of the judiciary.  It is not a fixed constraint, but one that is politically determined.           
                                                 
8 This does not assume that judges are merely carrying out the wishes of those who appoint them.  However, there is 
a substantial amount of evidence that judges do share the ideological preferences of those who place them on the 
court.  If a current regime views an existing statute unfavorably, it is likely that a judge appointed by that regime 
will share that ideological disposition.  Where the text contains imprecise or uncertain language, the interpretation is 
most likely to reflect that ideological preference. 
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 This is why treating courts as endogenous institutions is so important to developing a 
clear understanding of just how urban regimes operate.  It brings the state into the understanding 
of urban politics without dismissing the agency of urban policy-makers.  If the constraints 
imposed on governing coalitions varies depending on the makeup of the judiciary, then the 
actions of the governing coalition can be expected to adapt to account for those variations.  The 
questions driving growth machine theory and urban regime theory alike are concerned with how 
power is actually exercised.  Ignoring the changing influence of the judiciary is to miss an 
important piece of the puzzle. 
 So what are the relevant questions to ask about courts in order to engage them in the 
study of urban politics?  First, there are some characteristics about the cities themselves that 
ought to be identified.  How much independence does the city have constitutionally and 
statutorily from state oversight?  This is typically captured by determining whether the city is 
operating under home rule and/or Dillon’s Rule.  This is relevant because it offers insight into 
how effectively the city might be able to resist the enforcement of state laws.  The next question 
to answer is how closely tied is the urban regime to the state-level regime?  Do they share the 
same policy goals or are they in opposition with one another?  Finally, where relevant, how well 
do the urban regime’s interests align with the interests of the political regime dominant in the 
federal courts?  Note that the dominant regime in the courts is not necessarily the dominant 
national regime in the other political institutions at that time.  Because of the life terms for 
federal judges, the federal judiciary is likely to lag behind political changes in other institutions.   
These questions can just as readily be asked of suburbs or other forms of regional 
governance, given the fact that the jurisdiction of courts often extends beyond city boundaries.  
Examining these types of communities would prompt an additional inquiry, though.  What is the 
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relationship between the suburb (or regional government, etc.) and the urban regime in the 
adjacent city?  What, if any, are the tensions between those two regimes?  Each of these inquiries 
is necessary to understand how the city is situated in its political context. 
       Turning to the courts, the first thing to determine is the formal and informal selection 
method for judges in the state.  Formal selection methods generally fall into three broad 
categories: election, executive appointment, and legislative appointment.  Executive 
appointments may be done directly by the governor or through some form of merit selection 
process where the governor is provided with a formal list.  Elections may be partisan, 
nonpartisan, or retention following executive appointment.  The informal aspects of selection 
methods require a bit more attention to determine.  For example, many states where judges are 
putatively elected actually use gubernatorial appointment of vacancies to fill most seats.  The 
largest influence on the make-up of the judiciary in these states, then, is not the voters but the 
governor.9  Other informal processes include party control of who has access to the ballot.  In 
some cities with partisan elections, such as Chicago and New York City, local party leaders 
control the nomination process.  Unless a candidate has the approval of the local party 
leadership, they will not appear on the ballot.  In some states with the formal method of merit 
selection, the nominating committee might be dominated by plaintiff’s attorneys or by members 
of one political party.  There can also be variation in both formal and informal selection methods 
for different levels of courts within the state. 
The formal and informal selection method of federal judges does not vary by city, but 
should be accounted for as well.  Traditionally, district court judges are recommended by a home 
state senator who shares the president’s political party.  If there is no senator from the president’s 
party in a given state, presidents may reach out to state party leadership.  Appellate court judges 
                                                 
9 This is particularly true given the substantial incumbency advantage that sitting judges have on election day. 
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are usually run past the senators from the affected states, but much less deference is given.  This 
is even truer for the Supreme Court.  How judges get on the bench is an important element of 
treating courts as endogenous.  This provides insight into how closely aligned the courts are 
likely to be to the urban regime. 
Moving past the selection methods, there are institutional characteristics of the judiciary 
that can be of relevance.  How long are the terms for the judges?  Do judges serve four year 
terms before facing reelection or do they serve a single eighteen year term?  This can vary by the 
level of court in question.  Judges that have sat on the bench for longer may be more likely to 
reflect the goals of regimes that are no longer in power, while rapid turnover makes it more 
likely that courts would be closely tied to current regimes.  Finally, what is the structure of the 
appellate courts in the state?  Some states have one statewide intermediate court of appeals with 
mandatory jurisdiction and one state supreme court with discretionary jurisdiction.  Others do not 
have any intermediate courts of appeals and simply have a supreme court with mandatory 
jurisdiction.  Other, larger states might divide up the appellate court by geographical district or 
even place it directly with the trial courts.  As with selection methods, the appellate structure of 
federal courts also needs to be addressed, although that too is fixed for all cities.  Attention to 
these details helps clarify how and when lower court decisions might be overturned and what 
level of state-wide control of lower courts is possible through appellate review. 
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Table 1: How to Treat Courts Endogenously 
Information about urban regime: Information about judiciary: 
Home Rule/Dillon’s Rule/Neither Formal selection method for state judiciary 
Relationship between urban regime and state-
level regime 
Informal selection method for state judiciary 
Relationship between urban regime and 
national-level regime in the judiciary (where 
appropriate) 
Formal selection method for federal judiciary 
(where appropriate) 
Relationship between suburban/regional 
regime and urban regime (where appropriate) 
Informal selection method for federal judiciary 
(where appropriate) 
 Length of terms 
 Structure of appellate courts 
   
 
Each of these aspects that impact urban politics are summarized in Table 1.  Most, such 
as formal selection methods and term lengths, are relatively straightforward to collect.  Others, 
such as informal selection methods have been studied in a variety of contexts and can be 
leveraged to better explain urban politics.  Some characteristics require a more nuanced study, 
particularly the relationship and alignment of urban regimes with state and federal regimes.  
Given the amount of hidden action, particularly when it comes to judicial decision-making, some 
conclusions about the role of courts would have to remain speculative.  Nonetheless, careful 
attention to these elements promises a richer, more thorough, and ultimately more informative 
way of understanding the dynamics of urban politics.  It can provide an understanding of why 
growth strategies manifest more successfully in some jurisdictions than others or why some 
approaches to development are more common than others.  In the following section, I trace the 
outlines of what this might look like in three different case studies to exemplify the explanatory 
value to be gained from treating courts endogenously. 
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Courts in Action: Three Case Studies 
 The following case studies are not intended to be exhaustive, but rather illustrative of the 
types of inquiries and insights that this approach to urban politics has to offer.  The three selected 
cities offer some variation on the relevant criteria above and each has been the subject of fairly 
extensive study by urban politics scholars.  The first, Portland, Oregon, offers an example of 
what may be the most common types of interactions between urban regimes and the judiciary, 
with the judiciary reflecting the priorities of the state regime and successfully constraining the 
available options for the region.  The second, Atlanta, Georgia, illustrates what happens when the 
local, state, and federal regimes are in a period of transition, at times aligned and at times at odds 
with one another.  The third, Chicago, Illinois, represents a tension between the local and state 
regime much like that in Portland.  In this instance, however, the local regime successfully resists 
the influence of the state regime through careful control of the judiciary. 
 
Portland, Oregon 
 Considering development within the Portland region today offers an opportunity to 
demonstrate the role of courts in urban politics.  To do so, it is first necessary to specify the 
criteria laid out in Table 1.  Portland is a complex city when it comes to describing its formal 
features.  The city falls within three counties, though each county also contains areas outside the 
incorporated limits of the city.  The city participates in an elected regional governance body 
called Metro that imposes constraints on what the city can do.  Its transit agency, TriMet, covers 
the region, not merely the city, again connecting the city closely with its neighbors.  A discussion 
of Portland politics has to account for more than just the city itself.  Portland, along with all other 
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Oregon cities, has had home rule since 1906, indicating some autonomy from state direction 
(Diller 2008).   
The city does have an urban regime, although one that has strong regional characteristics.  
Leo (1998) describes the regime as a growth management one rather than a growth machine.  
The urban regime largely reflects the progressive tradition within the state (Clucas and Henkels 
2005), though the conservative populists are well-represented in the outlying suburbs within the 
counties.10  The progressive regime of Portland has a mixed relationship with the state-level 
regime.  Oregon has elected Democratic governors consistently since the mid-1980s, although 
the state legislature has switched hands between the Democrats and Republicans more frequently 
over that period.  Despite this state-wide dominance, the actual operation of the state regime is 
more reflective of conservative populism than the urban regime of Portland.  This is in part a 
consequence of the state’s extensive use of the initiative process, which has, on a number of 
occasions, served to constrain the otherwise progressive efforts of the state regime. 
 The relationship between the urban regime and the federal level regime in the courts 
offers more tension.  Prior to the election of Barack Obama in 2008, the federal regime in the 
courts largely reflected conservative values since the election of Ronald Reagan, particularly on 
the Supreme Court.  As Pickerill and Clayton (2004) demonstrate, the federal judiciary came to 
reflect the preferences of the conservative national regime and that remains largely stable, given 
the slow process of change in the judiciary.  The formal and informal selection methods for 
federal judges are identified above.  The central point is that the selected judges are going to 
reflect some combination of national interests and local flavor, with national interests becoming 
more and more dominant in the higher level courts. 
                                                 
10 Clucas and Henkel (2005) suggest that the primary divide politically within the state is between progressives and 
conservative populists. 
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 State court judges are all elected to six year terms in nonpartisan races in Oregon.  
Though that is the formal selection method, the actual practice of selecting judges rests much 
more heavily on the governor.  Vacancies on the bench are filled by gubernatorial appointment 
and this process accounted for fully eighty-five percent of judicial positions from 1984 to 2004 
(Foster 2005, 183).  It is safe to say that the state regime, as reflected by the governor, exerts 
substantial influence on the makeup of the judiciary in Oregon.  Specifically, the Democratic 
dominance of the governor’s office since the mid-1980s means that the appointed judges are 
likely to be more in line with the progressive state regime rather than the oppositional 
conservative populist approach (Foster 2005, 184).  Finally, the structure of appellate review is 
statewide, with one court of appeals covering a statewide jurisdiction along with a supreme court 
to serve as the court of last resort.  The appellate court has one of the heaviest caseloads per 
judge of any appellate court in the country, which can result in delays and many unpublished 
opinions. 
 With this background, it is now possible to look at the influence of courts on the 
implementation of growth management strategies by the regime such as the urban growth 
boundary.  At the time of Leo’s (1998) study of Portland’s growth management approach, the 
state courts were written out of the process of direct review.  Indeed, state legislation in 1979 
created the Land Use Board of Appeals and stripped jurisdiction from the courts to consider any 
land use decisions (Leo 1998, 368–369).  Developments in the federal judiciary were starting to 
change this by the mid-1990s, though.  The U.S. Supreme Court’s Takings Clause decision in 
Nollan v. California Coastal Commission (1987) was a victory for the burgeoning property rights 
movement particularly focused in western states that found a receptive audience in a Supreme 
Court increasingly dominated by Republican appointees.  The case signaled willingness by the 
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Court to be more protective of property owners and impose some substantive restrictions on 
government regulation.  This emboldened property rights interest groups such as Oregonians in 
Action to be more aggressive in challenging the dominant growth management regime through 
the judiciary.  This proved successful in the Portland suburb of Tigard when the Court struck 
down the permit conditions imposed on a business seeking to expand (Dolan v. City of Tigard 
1994).  These decisions created barriers, though not insurmountable ones, to the enforcement of 
a growth management regime largely favored by downtown businesses and environmentalists 
(Leo 1998).  Success in the federal courts, which were dominated by a regime more receptive to 
property rights claims, did not extend to state courts where groups such as 1000 Friends of 
Oregon continued to find success in enforcing environmental standards even where land use 
decisions were off the table.  The politics of the state were starting to shift, however, especially 
through the initiative process. 
 The first apparent victory for this property rights coalition was in 2000, when the voters 
of Oregon approved Ballot Measure 7.  This measure would have required the state or local 
government to compensate property owners whenever a government regulation devalued their 
property.  This would have been a substantial blow to the growth management regime of 
Portland in particular, but was struck down by the Oregon Supreme Court for amending multiple 
parts of the state constitution (League of Oregon Cities v. State 2002).  Given the gubernatorial 
control over judicial appointments and consistent control of that office by politicians largely 
aligned with the Portland regime, this serves as an example of state-level courts and a state 
regime serving to protect an urban regime’s ability to pursue its goals. 
 The conservative populist movement within the state was not finished, however.  In 2004, 
the state passed another initiative, Ballot Measure 37, that once again required the government to 
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offer compensation for land use regulation that restricts use of the property and reduces its fair 
market value.  Alternatively, the government could remove, modify or not apply the regulation to 
avoid the requirement to pay.  This was struck down by a Marion County Circuit Court much 
like Measure 7, but in this instance, the Oregon Supreme Court overruled the lower court and 
upheld the initiative (MacPherson v. Department of Administrative Services 2006).  The rising 
success of the conservative populist movement within the state signaled not only by the repeated 
success of these measures, but also by gaining partial control of the state legislature, made it too 
politically costly for the Oregon Supreme Court to continue to resist.  That did not mean that the 
urban regime of Portland was done resisting.  With state courts enforcing the statewide 
consensus restricting property regulation and federal courts enforcing the federal regime 
preference to strengthen the protections of the Takings Clause, the constraints were real for the 
city and region.  The response was to have the state legislature place Ballot Measure 49 on the 
ballot in 2007.  This measure used much of the language of Measure 37, but in practice 
overturned many of the restrictions on regulating commercial property development.  For others, 
instead of cash payments for compensation, property owners could be compensated by the ability 
to build up to three homes on their affected property.  This was consistent with the goals that Leo 
described for the growth management regime of Portland- the intention was to “manage growth 
in order to promote it” (Leo 1998, 370). 
 Both of these measures, however, brought the state courts back into the picture, by 
offering the courts as a mechanism for enforcement of the losses experienced by property 
owners.  The state courts reflected and enforced the state-wide norms even where the city would 
have preferred greater independence.  Indeed, decisions about land use in Portland are made very 
much in the “shadow of the law.”  One prominent example of this was the recent resolution of 
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Area 93.  On January 1, 2014, the borders between Multnomah County and Washington County 
in Oregon were redrawn.  A 160 acre parcel of land designated as Area 93 was transferred from 
Multnomah County to Washington County.  This was the first adjustment of this size to the 
borders of Multnomah County since it was created in 1854 (Mistreanu 2014).  Area 93 was 
included within the Portland metro region’s Urban Growth Boundary in 2002, slated for 
residential and commercial development.  Problems quickly arose, however.  The area was just 
outside the boundaries of the city of Portland and Multnomah County does not provide any basic 
services such as water, electricity, or sewer.  The city of Portland refused to annex the area 
because it would have been non-contiguous with the rest of the city.  There was protected 
farmland in between the city boundary and Area 93 that was not within the urban growth 
boundary.   
The simple solution at this point would have been to drop Area 93 from the urban growth 
boundary and return it to its previously undeveloped state.   Measures 37 and 49 made this costly 
to do, however, because property owners purchased land in anticipation of development and 
threatened lawsuits seeking compensation.  After stalling for over ten years, the unusual 
resolution of redrawing county borders was seen as the only viable solution.  It was not what the 
local regime wanted, but it was necessary because state courts allowed for the enforcement of 
state-level preferences regarding property regulation.  This dynamic- state courts imposing 
constraints from state-level regimes on urban regimes- is quite common and offers insight into 
the policy choices that are available to the formal and informal actors that make up an urban 
regime.  This is not the only dynamic, though.  At times, the local, state, and federal regimes are 
in transition, making the courts an uncertain destination for both regime supporters and 
opponents. 
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Atlanta, Georgia 
 Between 1990 and 2000, the growth in the Atlanta region was almost unmatched.  The 
population in the metropolitan statistical area of Atlanta grew by almost 40% in just ten years 
(Henderson 2004, 196).  With this growth came sprawl and with the sprawl came greater and 
greater automobile traffic.  In 1996, the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) notified 
Atlanta’s transportation planners that they were out of conformity with the provisions of the 
Clean Air Act and faced the threat of withheld federal transportation funds if the amount of smog 
was not reduced, a threat that was carried out 18 months later (Henderson 2004, 197).  The 
Georgia Regional Transportation Authority (GRTA) set forth to develop a coherent and effective 
response to the transportation challenges of the region with the support of the dominant business 
interests.  GRTA was seen as a vehicle for challenging the powerful Georgia Department of 
Transportation (GDOT) in pursuing more mass transit-friendly development (Henderson 2004, 
200–201).  GRTA achieved some real successes in the early 2000s, but the battle of the Northern 
Arc freeway split the existing coalitions, ultimately leading to the electoral defeat of Governor 
Roy Barnes.  Throughout, the courts played an important role. 
 To effectively examine the role of the courts in this dispute, it is necessary to develop 
information about both the regime and the court system in Georgia during this period of time.  
Cities in Georgia have home rule, although it is a fairly limited form of home rule that does not 
grant much authority over the structure of local government (Fleischmann and Pierannunzi 2007, 
247).  Indeed, the state legislature is even authorized to enact local (rather than only general) 
legislation assuming support from the local state representatives.  Cities in Georgia, as a 
consequence, remain quite dependent on the state.  The Atlanta urban regime has received 
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extensive study, most prominently by Stone (1989).  Historically dominated by business elites 
and focused on economic growth, the regime continued to depend on a coalition of businesses 
and black politicians in the late 1990s and early 2000s (Fleischmann and Hardman 2004, 421).  
Concerns about how sprawl was affecting the city, combined with the increasing movement of 
business and capital out of the city to surrounding areas, led the regime to pursue goals of dense 
development, increased mass transit, and urban infill.  Growth remained an important 
consideration, but the regime goals were changing to balance environmental and equity 
imperatives (Konrad 2006).   
Growth was historically a dominant consideration at the state level as well.  The politics 
in Georgia tend to emphasize traditional values, conservative politics, and a general distrust of 
government, which lends itself to an emphasis on growth and development by business interests 
(Fleischmann and Pierannunzi 2007, 85).  In the area of transportation, the state regime had 
consistently pursued the construction of roads over other modes of transit.  The increasing threats 
from the federal government about pollution along with growing dissatisfaction among suburban 
Georgia residents about traffic were starting to break this consensus down, though.  The election 
of Governor Roy Barnes in 1998 signaled a departure from the laissez-faire attitude towards 
transportation from his predecessor, Governor Zell Miller.  Barnes would go on to advocate for 
an aggressive role for the state in pursuing transportation policies that would result in compliance 
with EPA directives (Basmajian 2013, 165–166).  This was aligned to some degree with the 
Atlanta regime, but the state-wide emphasis on road building was impossible for Barnes to 
escape, something which left him in conflict with the urban regime.   
The relationship with the surrounding region was even more complicated, given the 
lasting effects of white flight and the more conservative nature of the outer suburbs.  In 
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particular, the growth in the northern suburbs was whiter and wealthier than in other parts of the 
region (Basmajian 2013, 136–137).  Growth strategies dominated politically here as well, but 
they were tempered by those feeling the greatest negative effects of the region’s sprawl.  Regime 
change was also happening at this level.  The election of 1992 saw turnover among one-fourth of 
the members of the Atlanta Regional Commission (ARC) made up of city and county-level 
politicians (Basmajian 2013, 148).  The newly elected regional leaders did not have the same 
experience as the departing members when it came to regional cooperation and were faced with a 
dramatically worsening situation with respect to federal intervention.  The northern suburbs, who 
dominated the ARC, shared the environmental and growth concerns of the Atlanta regime, but 
were less interested in the equity concerns.  In addition, the building of additional roads 
remained popular with a significant part of the coalition, although it was a controversial question.   
 The relationship between the urban growth regime and the federal government reflected 
some serious tension as indicated by the EPA’s decision to withhold federal transportation 
funding.  The federal regime was, as was true for the state, undergoing shifts in regimes.  The 
election of Bill Clinton in 1992 to the White House brought the first Democrat to the presidency 
since Jimmy Carter, but Democrats soon lost their majority in the House and Senate in the 1994 
election.  Democratic action in Congress in 1990 on the Clean Air Act, combined with 
enforcement decisions that reflected President Clinton’s priorities in the subsequent years, put 
the old-guard Atlanta and Georgia regimes at odds with the federal regime.  There was shared 
ground with the Atlanta regime, though, in developing a different model of transit development.  
These changes in the federal regime did not necessarily translate immediately into the federal 
judiciary because of the lagged nature of appointments.  The Supreme Court remained fairly 
stable ideologically, while the lower courts slowly shifted in a more liberal direction with 
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Clinton’s appointments.  The federal judiciary, like so many of the relevant regimes, was in a 
period of transition during this time.  President Clinton appointed four new judges to the twelve-
judge Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals and three to the eleven-judge D.C. Circuit Court of 
Appeals, the two most relevant federal courts.  Both retained majorities, though, of Republican 
appointees from Presidents Ronald Reagan and George H.W. Bush.  Whether the federal courts 
were supportive, indifferent, or hostile to the local regimes depended largely on who was 
selected for the three-judge panels.  This uncertainty about the outcome made the federal courts 
an effective threat to encourage settlement because no party could be certain of success. 
 Turning to the Georgia judiciary, the judges within the system are formally selected 
through nonpartisan elections.  This diminishes the role that political parties play in access to the 
ballot.  Superior Court judges serve four year terms, while Court of Appeals judges and Supreme 
Court justices serve six year terms.  In practice, though, many of the lower court judges, and 
even some Supreme Court justices, are appointed by the governor as a result of vacancy.  
Between 1968 and 1994, 66 percent of Superior Court judgeships were appointed by the 
governor (Fleischmann and Pierannunzi 2007, 236).  Given this, as was the case in Oregon, it is 
reasonable to expect that the judges will be more likely to reflect state-level regime preferences 
over local regime preferences.  This is bolstered by the fact that the state has only one centralized 
court of appeals, allowing the state to retain control over the appellate process.  Given the delay 
in changes to the judiciary when a new regime emerges, it is likely that the Georgia judiciary 
during this period still reflected on the whole the preferences of two-term governor Zell Miller 
rather than single-term governor Roy Barnes. 
 With this political context in mind, it is time to return to the conflict over the Northern 
Arc.  The Northern Arc began as a proposal for an Outer Perimeter freeway back in the 1960s.  
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The freeway would encircle Atlanta at a distance of up to 50 miles (Henderson 2004, 205).  
Though planning never went forward on the freeway, it remained a part of the state’s long-term 
transportation plan for decades.  Increased resistance to the project resulted in it being whittled 
down over time to just a 59 mile arc running through the northern suburbs.11  That was the status 
of the plan when the EPA took notice of Atlanta’s rapidly decreasing air quality and stepped in.  
As the region struggled to address both rapid growth and serious air quality issues in the 1990s, 
the Metropolitan Atlanta Chamber of Commerce advanced a series of transit-centric 
development projects that sought to increase the capacity and importance of the Metropolitan 
Atlanta Regional Transit Authority (MARTA).  Telecommunications company Bell South, for 
example, concentrated development around several north-side MARTA rail stations, while other 
surrounding communities emphasized higher-density, mixed-use development that allowed for 
walking and bicycling (Henderson 2004, 198).  Consistent with the business support, the 
emphasis on this development was in the northern areas of the region as opposed to the southern, 
more heavily African-American and lower income areas.   
Despite these developments, the Northern Arc remained a part of GDOT’s road plan that 
was submitted to the EPA in 1994 and remained in subsequent plans through 1996 despite 
serious concerns about its impact on air pollution.  Facing an impending loss of federal road 
funding and receiving little guidance or support from the governor, ARC and GDOT sought to 
protect at least some federal transportation funding by grandfathering in road projects that would 
worsen air quality as long as they were previously budgeted and had completed environmental 
studies.  Thirty-three road projects, not including the Northern Arc, used an expedited process 
for generating environmental impact statements in hopes that the U.S. Department of 
Transportation and the EPA would approve them (Basmajian 2013, 155–156). 
                                                 
11 For a more detailed review of these developments over time, see Basmajian (2013, 145–153). 
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The EPA allowed an interim plan with these grandfathered road projects to go forward, 
but no one was happy and transportation played an important role in the 1998 gubernatorial race.  
The election of Roy Barnes suggested that change might occur, which triggered the first federal 
lawsuit challenge to this interim plan.  The Southern Environmental Law Center represented a 
number of environmental and citizen groups alleging that the interim plan allowing the 
grandfathered road projects violated federal law and could only be adopted in conjunction with a 
broader plan to reduce emissions over twenty years (Basmajian 2013, 158–159).  This reflected 
the preferred position of the Atlanta regime and likely that of the newly-elected governor, but 
was strongly resisted by the ARC.  By 1999, the federal judiciary reflected the Democratic 
administration and priorities more closely than in earlier decades and could potentially offer 
support to push back against the ARC and GDOT.  The threat of a federal lawsuit was sufficient 
to give Barnes the political capital to pass legislation creating the Georgia Regional 
Transportation Authority (GRTA), an agency that would coordinate land-use and transportation 
policy throughout the metropolitan Atlanta region with final say over transportation expenditures 
(Henderson 2004, 200–201).  When negotiations broke down due to ARC’s insistence on 
keeping the grandfathered road projects in the plan, the threatened lawsuit was filed in federal 
court.  The plaintiffs were concerned that allowing the grandfathered projects in would open the 
door to a plan with the Northern Arc in it getting approval from the EPA (Basmajian 2013, 160).  
Relying on the language of the 1990 amendments to the Clean Air Act, the litigants hoped that 
the federal courts would be responsive to their claims. 
They were successful, though not in their own case.  Shortly after filing the case, the 
Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit decided a similar case out of Washington, D.C. and 
concluded that Congress did not intend to allow road projects to go forward that were not fully 
31 
 
vetted for their impact on air quality (Environmental Defense Fund v. EPA et Al. 1999).  The two 
judges in the majority included a Clinton appointee and a Carter appointee with a Reagan 
appointee dissenting.  The decision ended up reflecting the Democratic administration’s position, 
though not necessarily Congress’ position at that moment.  The outcome reverberated in Georgia 
and resulted in a significantly empowered GRTA, to say nothing of the victory it granted the 
urban regime at the expense of the regional regimes. 
The battles were not finished, however.  ARC and GDOT largely conceded to GRTA’s 
preferences, but the proposed plan still failed to satisfy important environmental constituencies.  
Another lawsuit was filed in federal court in April to block approval of the new transit plan, 
earning a stay from the Eleventh Circuit shortly after the EPA approved the plan in July 
(Basmajian 2013, 163–164).  Before a ruling could be issued, though, ARC and the Department 
of Transportation reached agreement on an older plan and the litigants agreed in December to 
dismiss the case.  Neither side was certain of victory, so settlement was the preferred outcome.  
Even this agreement did not last long.  By January, those opposed to the road development felt 
that Gov. Barnes was backing out of the settlement that was agreed upon to dismiss the earlier 
lawsuit.  ARC and increasingly the central business community of Atlanta were frustrated by the 
continued litigation, indicating a preference on the part of both urban and regional regimes to 
move forward with the plan.  Opponents of the plan hoped to use the federal courts as a 
sympathetic ear to halt the plan, but were running out of support at the federal level, given the 
approval by the EPA and U.S. DOT.  Litigants failed to get an injunction against construction 
from the district court before a Clinton-appointed judge (Sierra Club v. Atlanta Regional 
Commission 2001). 
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Gov. Barnes took the opportunity in the wake of the favorable district court decision to 
introduce his own transportation plan.  Using a little-known bonding process, Barnes proposed a 
wide sweep of transportation projects ranging from light rail projects to high-occupancy vehicle 
lanes, all of which would be completed without federal funding.  If adopted, this would bypass 
the need to get federal approval and take the federal courts out of the picture.  Controversially, 
though, Barnes included the Northern Arc as part of this proposed transportation plan.  Big road 
construction remained popular in rural Georgia and was advocated for by a number of key 
Barnes supporters.  In addition, Barnes acted without consulting the ARC as representative of the 
regional regimes.  This proposal split the coalitions apart in unusual ways, combining 
conservative Republican suburban neighborhood groups with environmentalists.  The business 
community divided on the issue as well, with some expressing strong opposition, but most 
remaining silent (Henderson 2004, 206–208).  Barnes’ plan met with increasing resistance while 
federal suits were still pending against the existing plan.   
ARC and GDOT won a victory for their plan in January of 2002, when the same district 
court judge who refused to issue an injunction granted summary judgment to the EPA, 
concluding that approval of the plan was consistent with the federal statutory guidelines (Sierra 
Club v. Atlanta Regional Commission 2002).  Despite a temporary order from Eleventh Circuit 
requiring ARC to meet a more stringent air quality measure in April, the Eleventh Circuit 
decided by the end of the year that the case was moot and dismissed it (Sierra Club v. 
Environmental Protection Agency, 2002).  The judges in the unanimous decision were two 
Clinton appointees and a Bush appointee.  Despite the lack of receptivity to opponents’ 
arguments in the Eleventh Circuit, Gov. Barnes wanted to avoid the consequences of a potential 
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future loss and started to backpedal on the question of the Northern Arc (Basmajian 2013, 168).  
Given his lack of control over the federal judiciary, this was a reasonable concern. 
By August, though, he was facing challenges in state court to his plan to avoid federal 
oversight.  A coalition of suburban homeowners and environmental groups called the Northern 
Arc Task Force filed suit in Fulton County Superior Court challenging the bond funding method 
in Barnes’ plan in a bid to stop the construction of the freeway.  The suit put at risk not only the 
Northern Arc funding, but all the other, far more popular, projects in Gov. Barnes’ plan.  This 
put the Northern Arc Task Force at odds with the urban, regional, and state regimes despite 
support among the urban regime for the resistance to the Northern Arc.  Unsurprisingly, given 
this political environment, the Northern Arc Task Force lost at both the superior court and 
eventually Georgia Supreme Court level (Basmajian 2013, 169–170).  The unusual bonding 
method was permissible and the other projects would not lose their funding as a result of the 
decision. 
All of this was too late to save Gov. Barnes.  He lost the November 2002 election to his 
Republican opponent Sonny Perdue.  Opposition to the Northern Arc played a major role in 
Perdue’s campaign against Barnes and after his election, Perdue carried through on his campaign 
promise of eliminating the Northern Arc from the state’s long-term transportation plans.12 
So how does attention paid to the politics of the courts in these circumstances enhance 
our understanding of local governance?  First, it highlights the different threats presented by 
federal versus state courts.  Though the Northern Arc Task Force lawsuits garnered substantial 
attention at the time, the likelihood of success (and thus the threat to the regime’s preferences) 
was far lower than in the federal cases because of the alignment between state and local 
preferences on the issue at hand.  A direct attack on the Northern Arc might have increased the 
                                                 
12 He also refused to back any other part of Perdue’s plan, including the transit-oriented projects. 
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tension and divide between the state and local regime, but likely would not have been much 
more successful given state-level influence on the judiciary.  Second, it highlights the importance 
of federal regime preferences in local politics.  Though the EPA and U.S. DOT obviously 
exercised direct regulatory oversight, it was fear of federal court lawsuits that prompted a 
number of compromises by all parties.  Neither urban, regional, nor state regimes exercise 
extensive influence over the federal courts but are subject to their rulings.  Finally, periods of 
regime transition significantly increase the uncertainty surrounding court action.  The likelihood 
of regime-supportive judges hearing cases will vary depending on whether the new regime has 
had time to influence the makeup of the judiciary.  In this case, regime change was happening 
most notably at the regional and federal levels, although there were changes in regime 
preferences at the urban and state levels as well.  In that unsettled environment, courts can 
become a greater threat to regime stability. 
 
Chicago, Illinois 
 The Daley machine of the late 1960s in Chicago was quite powerful, but was it subject to 
the same restrictions and constraints imposed by the state as Portland is today?  Were courts an 
effective threat to regime stability as in Atlanta in the early 2000s?  A careful look at the 
characteristics of the regime and the judiciary will show that Chicago presents a different 
dynamic.  The Daley regime fit the description of a classic political machine.  Control was 
centralized and payoffs were made to relevant interests to maintain political power.  The city was 
certainly interested in growth, undergoing a massive urban renewal project under Daley’s 
leadership (Rast 2009, 173).  To evaluate the relationship between the courts and the urban 
regime, it is necessary to once again identify the criteria from Table 1.   
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One criterion would suggest that the city should not have had much independence.  Home 
rule did not come to Illinois until 1970 despite repeated efforts by Chicago throughout the 
twentieth century.  Being granted this status may have helped the Daley machine towards the end 
of its life, but not through the bulk of its time.  Nonetheless, the city was able to act with a fair 
degree of independence.  One cause for this was the tight control over state delegates from 
Chicago that Daley held.  Daley not only controlled who represented Chicago, but he chaired the 
state central committee for the Democratic party, which ensured influence over Democratic 
representatives from other parts of the state as well (Weir, Wolman, and Swanstrom 2005, 738).  
This did not mean that all relations were smooth between the urban regime and the state regime.  
Republicans and even downstate Democrats chafed at Daley’s control and were eager to limit his 
authority in Chicago and the state more generally.  The relationship was an uncertain one, 
protected largely by the sizeable number of delegates from Chicago.  The urban regime had a 
more comfortable relationship with the federal regime, acquiring more federal dollars for urban 
renewal than any other city in the country (Rast 2009, 174).  The one area of disagreement was 
over civil rights.  As the dominant regime of Democrats at the national level moved in favor of 
civil rights for African-Americans, Daley remained a hold-out.  This was visible in segregated 
housing policies within the city that Daley continued to protect. 
Judges in Cook County, unlike those in the Portland and Atlanta regions, were elected 
through partisan elections, although there were some slight modifications implemented during 
Daley’s reign.  Once on the bench, the judges stood for an uncontested retention election after 
serving a six year term.  Vacancies were filled temporarily by the state supreme court rather than 
by the governor.  Appellate court judges were selected the same way, but served for nine year 
terms until 1964, when the terms were changed to ten years.  The informal selection procedures 
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demonstrate the ways in which Daley was able to dominate the selection of judges for the state 
trial courts.  To be elected as a judge, a nominee had to be slated by the central committee.  Since 
Daley sat as chair of the central committee, he effectively controlled who could be judge.  Not 
surprisingly, the result was that most of the judges came up through the machine- indeed, many 
were former ward bosses (Royko 1971, 64; Tuohy and Warden 1989, 45–46).  Appellate courts 
within the state are divided into five geographic districts.  Importantly for consideration of the 
politics of Chicago, the First Judicial District of the Appellate Court covers only Cook County.  
This meant that Daley could exercise influence not only over the trial courts, but also over the 
initial stages of the appellate system. 
The formal selection method for federal judges of presidential appointment and Senate 
confirmation remained unchanged.  The informal selection method for the federal courts at the 
time reflected the continuous domination of the New Deal coalition and its eventual fracturing 
during the 1960s.  Federal judges generally reflected the ideology of their appointing Democratic 
presidents, which, as noted above, were largely aligned with the interests of the urban regime 
except on questions of civil rights. 
In what ways did this relationship with the judiciary impact the regime’s ability to 
govern?  By retaining control of the state judiciary, Daley was able to resist efforts of both 
downstate political rivals and external national civil rights groups to force change within the city.  
Two incidents are indicative of this dynamic.  The first was the aftermath of the 1960 election in 
Illinois.  It triggered extensive interest because of its implications for the Kennedy-Nixon 
presidential election, but it was the result of the state’s attorney race in Cook County that showed 
the greatest electoral oddities.  Mayor Daley permitted a special prosecutor to be appointed to 
investigate claims of election fraud, but he did not leave the process alone.  Although the special 
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prosecutor specifically sought a judge from outside of Chicago because of concerns about 
corruption, the downstate judge that was selected was also a part of the state’s Democratic 
machine and most of the charges were eventually dropped (Royko 1971, 119–120).  Daley was 
able to leverage his influence in the judiciary to fend off external challenges. 
This influence was valuable for protecting individual members of the regime as well.  
After the killing of two Black Panthers by fourteen Chicago police officers, a special state grand 
jury investigated Mayor Daley’s handpicked state’s attorney Edward Hanrahan for his role in 
ordering the raid that resulted in the deaths.  At the conclusion of the investigation, the grand 
jury returned an indictment against Hanrahan and thirteen of the police officers.  Judge Joseph 
Power, a neighbor and former law partner of the mayor, in an almost unheard of action, refused 
to sign the formal presentment.  He accused the head of the grand jury investigation, Barnabas 
Sears, of inadequately carrying out his responsibilities and ordered the grand jury to hear 
testimony directly from Hanrahan.  After hearing twenty hours of testimony from Hanrahan, the 
grand jury again attempted to present an indictment.  Judge Power appointed a special friend of 
the court to determine whether Sears had inappropriately influenced the grand jury.  After three 
months of appeals to the Illinois Supreme Court, the high court finally ordered Judge Power to 
deliver the indictments.  Power agreed, but in his last act as arraigning judge assigned the case to 
Judge Philip Romiti, another judge with close personal ties to the Daley machine.  Over a year 
later, Judge Romiti acquitted Hanrahan of all wrong doing in the case (Biles 1995, 179–180).  
This set of events highlights the ways in which the urban regime of Chicago was able to rely on 
control of the judiciary to resist state influence rather than having courts act as a mechanism for 
enforcing state-level constraints.  Of particular importance to understanding this dynamic is the 
selection method for the judges and the relationship between urban and state regimes.  As these 
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case studies demonstrate, courts may be used to reflect (Portland, Atlanta to some degree) or 
resist (Chicago) external constraints on the operation of urban regimes.  
 
Conclusion 
 This paper set out to highlight the ways in which treating courts as endogenous 
institutions rather than exogenous shocks to the political system offers a richer and more nuanced 
way of understanding how and why urban regimes are able to act.  Doing so does have its 
drawbacks.  It is more appropriate for better understanding specific situations in cities than grand 
theory building.  It also requires careful attention to specific contexts and the gathering of data 
not typically collected about cities.  In addition, there is much about court activity at the local 
level that is largely invisible to outside study.  Incorporating courts into the study of local politics 
is unlikely to generate a perfect understanding of the dynamics at play.  However, by drawing on 
the long-standing insight of law and courts scholars that courts are political institutions, scholars 
of urban politics can improve their own understanding of how urban regimes operate and pursue 
their goals. 
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